

*Email:* [REDACTED]

4 May 2018

To whom it may Concern

### **Testimony for Stan Keable**

I, Moshé Machover, am a dissident Israel citizen, born in Palestine in 1936. I have been living in London since 1968 and am naturalised British citizen. I have spent many years researching, and opposing, the Zionist ideology and the Zionist project.

I understand that Mr Stan Keable is accused of a disciplinary offence in connection with statements that he made to the effect that

1. "... the Zionist movement collaborated with them" (ie, the Nazis).
2. "The Zionist movement from the beginning was saying that Jews are not acceptable here."

I am astonished at this, because these are factual statements, whose veracity is well known to all serious researchers of the history of Zionism.

**As to Statement (1):** I must make it clear that the collaboration in question occurred in the early years of the Nazi regime, long before it became clear that the regime is intent on a policy of extermination of Jews, and in fact before this policy had been decided upon.

There is the well-known Haavara agreement signed on 25 August 1933, between the Nazi government and the Zionist Federation of Germany. Much material about this agreement is publicly available (for example in Wikipedia, under the entry 'Haavara Agreement'). Briefly, it facilitated the transfer of assets of Jews emigrating from Germany to Palestine, by converting these assets to German export goods. This served the Nazi regime because "it facilitated the emigration of German Jews while breaking the anti-Nazi boycott of 1933, which had mass support among European Jews and was thought by the German state to be a potential threat to the German economy." (Wikipedia).

Let me add a fact that is less well known. The early collaboration had an ideological background. The Zionists – who were very much a minority among German Jews – believed that the Jews were not German but belonged to a separate nation/race. They were strongly opposed to assimilation and especially to mixed marriage between Jews and non-Jews. In this they believed in those early years to have found common ground with Nazi ideology. Thus, one of the main Zionist leaders in Germany, Rabbi Joachim Prinz (1902–1988) wrote in his book *Wir Juden* (We Jews) published in Berlin in 1934:

“[The Jews] have been drawn out of the last secret recesses of christening and mixed marriages. We are not unhappy about it. In their being forced to declare themselves, to show real determined courage, to stand by their community, we see at the same time the fulfilment of our desires. [...] The theory of assimilation has collapsed. We are no longer hidden in secret recesses. We want to replace assimilation by something new: *the declaration of belonging to the Jewish nation and the Jewish race*. A state, built according to the principle of purity of the nation and race [ie the Third Reich], can only be honoured and respected by a Jew who *declares* his belonging to his own kind.” (p. 154, my emphasis)

I attach below two documents that support and amplify the evidence for Statement (1).

(A) A photocopy of six pages from the book *The War against the Jews (1933 – 45)* by Lucy S Dawidowicz.

(B) Review of the book *Zionism and Anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany* by Francis Nicosia, which summarizes that book.

**As to Statement (2):** In the early years of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the main leaders of the Jewish community in Britain rejected Zionism. One of their main objections was precisely that the Zionists claimed that the Jews did not belong in Britain and were never going to be acceptable here. Thus, when Lucien Wolf, distinguished journalist and leading member of the Conjoint Foreign Committee of British Jews, was confronted with Chaim Weizmann’s effort to obtain what was to be known as the Balfour Declaration, he wrote a worried letter to James de Rothschild, dated August 31 1916.

“Dear Mr. James de Rothschild,

“At the close of our conference with Dr. Weizmann on the 17th inst., you asked me to write you a letter defining my view.

...

“I have thought over very carefully the various statements made to me by Dr. Weizmann, and, with the best will in the world, I am afraid I must say that there are vital and irreconcilable difference of principles and method between us.

“The question of principle is raised by Dr. Weizmann’s assertion of a Jewish nationality. The assertion has to be read in the light of the authoritative essay on ‘Zionism and the Jewish Future’ recently published by Mr. Sacher, more especially those written by Dr. Weizmann himself and by Dr. Gaster. I understand from these essays that *the Zionists do not merely propose to form and establish a Jewish nationality in Palestine, but that they claim all the Jews as forming at the present moment a separate and dispossessed nationality, for which it is necessary to find an organic political centre, because they are and must always be aliens in the lands in which they now dwell* (Weizmann P. 6), and, more especially, because it is ‘an absolute self delusion’ to believe that any Jew can be at once ‘English by nationality and Jewish by faith’ (Gaster Pp. 92, 93). I

*have spent most of my life in combating these very doctrines, when presented to me in the form of anti-Semitism, and I can only regard them as the more dangerous when they come to me in the guise of Zionism. They constitute a capitulation to our enemies which has absolutely no justification in history, ethnology, or the facts of everyday life, and if they were admitted by the Jewish people as a whole, the result would only be that the terrible situation of our coreligionists in Russia and Romania would become the common lot of Jewry throughout the world.”<sup>1</sup>*

And on May 24 1917, as negotiations that were to lead to the Balfour Declaration were at an advanced stage, Alexander and Claude Montefiore, presidents respectively of the Board of Deputies of British Jews and of the Anglo-Jewish Association, wrote a letter to the *Times* in the name of the Conjoint Committee of these two bodies, protesting against the fallacies and dangers of political Zionism. After declaring their adherence to Lucien Wolf's position, the writers went on to say that

“...establishment of a Jewish nationality in Palestine, founded on the theory of Jewish homelessness, must have the effect throughout the world of stamping the Jews as strangers in their native lands and of undermining their hard-won positions as citizens and nationals of those lands.”

They point out that the theories of political Zionism undermined the religious basis of Jewry to which the only alternative would be

“... a secular Jewish nationality, recruited on some loose and obscure principle of race and of ethnographic peculiarity. But this would not be Jewish in any spiritual sense, and its establishment in Palestine would be a denial of all the ideals and hopes by which the survival of Jewish life in that country commends itself to the Jewish conscience and Jewish sympathy. On these grounds the Conjoint Committee of the Board of Deputies and the Anglo-Jewish Association deprecates earnestly the national proposals of the Zionists.”

Thus the statements attributed to Mr Keable are well founded, and making them can in no way be a valid reason for disciplining him.

Yours truly,



4 May 2018

Professor (emeritus) Moshé Machover

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<sup>1</sup> Photocopy of typewritten original in B. Destani (ed.) *The Zionist Movement and the Foundation of Israel 1839-1972*, 10 Volume Set: *Political Diaries 1918-1965*, Archive Editions, Cambridge, 2004; vol 1 p. 727. My emphasis.

problems and priorities of the Jewish organizations in trying to foster a systematic programme of emigration.<sup>13</sup>

Matters affecting Jews that were within the competence of the Ministry of Economy, also largely staffed with old-line government officials, were handled according to the habitual bureaucratic routine. A paradoxical example was the successful appeal, after initial prohibitions, by Jewish textile and clothing factories to obtain government contracts to produce goods for the armed services. The most significant instance of normal official procedures was the negotiations between the Ministry of Economy and the Jewish Agency for Palestine, concluding in the so-called 'Haavara agreements' of August 1933. These were, in essence, a compromise on the issue of emigrants' blocked accounts. Under this arrangement Jews emigrating to Palestine deposited their assets in special blocked accounts in Germany, held by a Jewish trust company. Once in Palestine the emigrant would be paid off half the amount in Palestine pounds. The other half was credited towards the purchase of finished German goods by the Jewish Agency, which paid half the cost in Palestine pounds. The Foreign Office, too, was involved in the implementation of the agreements over the years, and the officials there manifested similar courtesy and correctness, and sometimes even more.<sup>14</sup>

The Haavara agreements were not regarded as an ideological matter related to the Jewish question, but rather as a matter of the German economy. The arrangement was seen as boosting German production and German exports and discouraging a worldwide Jewish boycott of German goods. Hitler appeared to have no objections to the agreement, for he made a neutral passing reference to it in a speech on 24 October 1933. As evidence that England was bad and Germany good, Hitler said that while England was hindering Jewish settlement in Palestine, Germany was aiding it, even to the extent of letting the emigrant take out of the country the currency required for the landing fee in Palestine.<sup>15</sup>

In 1934 it was widely held in Germany that the Jewish question had already been settled, though few people in the NSDAP leadership thought so. In the absence of clear-cut directives or guidelines, various ideas began to be bruited about in National Socialist circles about how to deal with the Jews. Goebbels, for one, seemed to be thinking along the lines of extending formal recognition of a ghettoized Jewish community.

The idea no doubt derived from his experience with the Kulturbund deutscher Juden, an organization of Jewish actors, musicians, singers and entertainers set up in 1933, after they had lost their jobs. The Kulturbund was formed to provide a means of livelihood for its members by arranging concerts, plays and entertainment exclusively for the Jewish community. It was permitted to function under the supervision of a cultural commissar in Goebbels's Propaganda Ministry, who evolved a policy that Goebbels pridefully called 'Jewish cultural autonomy'. The Kulturbund was not only encouraged to perform the works of Jewish writers and composers, but was forbidden to perform works by Germans and 'Aryans'. This *de facto* situation may have given rise to the thought of formalizing it in a *de jure* arrangement applying to the entire Jewish community. At the end of 1934, another official in Goebbels's ministry, Hans Friedrich Blunck, then president of the Reichsschrifttumskammer (Reich Board of Literature), in an article in *Europäische Revue*, introduced that notion in a backhanded way. 'The efforts of German literature', he wrote, 'to achieve a concordat between the remaining Jewish population in the Reich and the government have been impeded again and again at the decisive moment by attacks from abroad.'<sup>16</sup> Presumably that sentence was a sort of trial balloon. Though the response in the Jewish press indicated cautious interest in the proposal, nothing further came of the idea. It may have been suppressed at a higher level in the National Socialist hierarchy, perhaps even by an angered reaction from Hitler.

The SS, for its part, continued to cast about for ideas that would provide a long-range solution to the Jewish question. In mid-1934 an SS report on this very subject remarked, with disappointment, that the 'armchair anti-Semites' were satisfied now that the Jews had been pulled down a peg or two. It was consequently the responsibility of the party to devise an anti-Jewish policy that would 'keep alive an awareness of the Jewish problem within the German people'.<sup>17</sup> The unknown writer of the report rejected the exercise of further economic pressures on the Jews on the ground that that might arouse a foreign boycott of German goods. Next he explored the idea of mass Jewish emigration as an alternative, calling attention to the fact that among German Jews only the Zionists advocated emigration and only they acknowledged that Jews could not truly be Germans. The

reporter then proposed, as a desirable programme, that the National Socialists give official preference to those Jewish organizations that promoted Jewish nationalism and separatism, while also encouraging those activities that prepared Jews for emigration.

Precisely such official encouragement was extended by the Bavarian political police, when Heydrich issued a directive to all police offices in the state on 28 January 1935: 'The activity of the Zionist-oriented youth organizations that are engaged in the occupational restructuring of the Jews for agriculture and manual trades prior to their emigration to Palestine lies in the interest of the National Socialist state's leadership'. These organizations, therefore, 'are not to be treated with that strictness that it is necessary to apply to the members of the so-called German-Jewish organizations (assimilationists)'.<sup>18</sup>

By spring, this approach had been legitimated, according to a directive of April 1935 that asserted that 'the attempts of German-Jewish organizations to persuade Jews to remain in Germany' directly contradicted National Socialist principles and were to be prevented. The Jewish press, too, was to be monitored 'to see that the more subtle forms of this propaganda are not disseminated'.<sup>19</sup> One way the policy was executed was to deny permission to speakers to address public Jewish gatherings if they were known to advocate a Jewish presence in Germany. Persons who did express such views were often brought to the Gestapo for interrogation and threatened with detention in a concentration camp.

On 15 May 1935 the *Schwarze Korps*, official organ of the SS, supported this policy as the correct ideological posture for National Socialists. The Jews, it was argued, had to be separated into two categories - Zionists and assimilationists: 'The Zionists adhere to a strict racial position and by emigrating to Palestine they are helping to build their own Jewish state.' But the assimilationists were objectionably tenacious: 'The assimilation-minded Jews deny their race and insist on their loyalty to Germany or claim to be Christians, because they have been baptised, in order to subvert National Socialist principles.'<sup>20</sup>

The enactment of the Nuremberg Laws encouraged this approach. The Zionists and proponents of emigration to Palestine were less badgered in their activities by the police and the SD than the non-Zionists. Pressure was constantly exerted on Jewish communal leaders

to pursue a policy of emigration, especially to Palestine. Removal of the Jews from Germany, *Entjudung* (de-Jewification) of Germany, seemed to have become the SS policy in the period between 1935 and 1938. Nevertheless, it was in no way official National Socialist policy and did not affect the routine bureaucratic procedures of the Reichswanderungsamt. The Haavara agreements were regarded with favour in SD circles as an incentive to Jewish emigration, but the Auslandsorganisation, the NSDAP branch dealing with Germans living abroad, strongly opposed it because it gave 'valuable support for the formation of a Jewish national state with the help of German capital'.<sup>21</sup>

Hitler issued no definitive statement in support of the SS policy of encouraging the Zionists and emigration to Palestine, apart from that reference in his speech in October 1933. Yet if Eichmann had read *Mein Kampf* (at his trial he admitted he never had), he would have seen that making a distinction between Zionists and assimilationists was not likely to win Hitler's approval. For Hitler had asserted that there was no difference when he had studied them in Vienna: 'This apparent struggle between Zionistic and liberal Jews disgusted me; for it was false through and through, founded on lies.' Furthermore, Hitler had little regard for Palestine as a Jewish state. He referred to Palestine only once in *Mein Kampf*, expressing the view that the Jews never intended to build a state for the purpose of living there: 'All they want is a central organization for their international world swindle, endowed with its own sovereign rights and removed from the intervention of other states: a haven for convicted scoundrels and a university for budding crooks.'

The international complications of Jewish settlement in Palestine and of Arab opposition do not seem to have become apparent to Hitler until 1937, when Palestinian Arabs first turned to the Germans for help against the Jewish settlement. In mid-1937 Foreign Minister Konstantin von Neurath began to formulate a policy on Palestine along the lines of *Mein Kampf*, asserting that the creation of a Jewish state was not in Germany's interest, because it would create a position of power for 'international Jewry somewhat like the Vatican State for political Catholicism or Moscow for the Comintern'. Hitler was apparently undecided, trying to reconcile the conflicting interests of his ministries with his own ideological views. Though he himself did not put anything down on paper, a government official reported in July 1937 that

Hitler had concluded that Jewish emigration should be concentrated on Palestine, because this would create 'only one centre of Jewish trouble in the world', which Germany could oppose by concerted counter-measures.<sup>22</sup> It may be no more than mere coincidence that about this time a Gestapo official who supervised Jewish organizations told a Jewish leader that the Gestapo did not like to have the Jews emigrate to America, but preferred Palestine, because 'there we will catch up with you'.<sup>23</sup>

By 1937 Eichmann had developed the idea that all matters relating to Jewish emigration should be centralized in one agency, and he adumbrated the idea of forced emigration, in actuality a policy of expulsion, as an expression of the German people's wrath against the Jews. That idea appealed to Heydrich, and in a short time it would become official policy.

The SD meanwhile still searched for an ideological or theoretical basis for an ongoing anti-Jewish policy for the National Socialist state. In a report of 28 August 1936 SS-Oberscharführer Schröder, Eichmann's superior at that time, described the work of his section with regard to the problem of arriving at an encompassing National Socialist definition of the concept of 'Jewry as an enemy of the State and Party'.<sup>24</sup> Schröder elaborated:

The Jew already as a person is a 100 per cent enemy of National Socialism, as proven by the difference in his race and nationality. Wherever he tries to transmit his work, his influence, and his world outlook to the non-Jewish world, he discharges it in hostile ideologies, as we find it in Liberalism, especially in Freemasonry, in Marxism, and not least also in Christianity. These ideologies then accord with a broader concept of Jewish mentality.

He concluded that the correct method of combating Jewry demanded sober judgement rather than the 'fantastic notions of well-known, so-called anti-Semites', an idea reminiscent of Hitler's earliest statement on anti-Semitism, his letter to Gemlich in September 1919. Here, then, was the germ of the idea that the Jew, simply by being a Jew and thereby an enemy of the 'Aryan' and hence of the National Socialist movement, would automatically become an enemy of the National Socialist state. The ideological concept was being transformed into a legal one.

Himmler, too, was developing the idea of the Jew as an enemy of the

state, less in a legal sense than in a combative sense. Early in 1937, in a lecture to the Wehrmacht on the nature and purpose of the SS, he spelled out the idea that the 'enemy in a war is an enemy not only in the military sense, but also an ideological enemy'.<sup>25</sup> A few months earlier he described the methods with which the SS would defend Germany against this enemy:

We shall unremittingly fulfil our task, to be the guarantors of the internal security of Germany, just as the Wehrmacht guarantees the safety of the honour, the greatness and the peace of the Reich from the outside. We shall take care that never more in Germany, the heart of Europe, can the Jewish-Bolshevistic revolution of sub-humans be kindled internally or by emissaries from abroad. Pitilessly we shall be a merciless executioner's sword for all these forces whose existence and doings we know . . . whether it be today, or in decades, or in centuries.<sup>26</sup>

Thus, at a time when talk of war was becoming the everyday rhetoric of National Socialist Germany, the SS, too, despite the careful paperwork of the SD, began increasingly to talk of war against the ideological enemy.

<http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/stackelberg050509.html>

## How Ideological Enemies Collaborated to Achieve Divergent Goals

by Roderick Stackelberg

Francis R. Nicosia. *Zionism and Anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany*. Cambridge University Press, 2008. xiv + 324 pp. \$85.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-521-88392-4.

### Zionism and Anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany

In his latest book, Francis R. Nicosia returns to and explores in greater detail one of the major topics of his important earlier book, *The Third Reich and the Palestine Question* (1985): the complex and sometimes symbiotic relationship between German Zionists and the National Socialists before the Holocaust. Unlike most previous studies of relations between Germans and Jews in the modern era, which have focused on the incompatibility of German ethnic nationalism and the dominant liberalism of most Germans,<sup>1</sup> Nicosia's study addresses a different confrontation: the relationship of *völkisch* German nationalism and antisemitism to Zionism, described in the introduction as "a *völkisch* Jewish nationalist ideology and movement that started from some of the same philosophical premises as German nationalism with regard to nationality, national life, and the proper definition and organization of peoples and states in the modern world" (p. 2). Although Nicosia traces *völkisch* influences on Zionist thought in the nineteenth and early twentieth century and reveals certain assumptions shared by Nazis and Zionists on how best to resolve Germany's "Jewish question" before the Second World War, he firmly rejects any suggestion of moral or political equivalency between German and Jewish nationalism. While Jewish nationalists wished to found a Jewish state in Palestine to escape from European antisemitism, German nationalists encouraged Jewish emigration to Palestine to rid their country of Jews. Both Zionists and antisemites rejected the liberal Enlightenment ideal of full Jewish assimilation in their host societies as free and equal citizens, but they did so for very different reasons. However, their differing motives and mutual hostility to each other did not prevent Nazis and Zionists from temporarily collaborating to achieve their respective ends.

Most of Nicosia's thoroughly researched book is devoted to examining how German Zionists tried to gain Nazi cooperation in the Zionist project and how the Nazis tried to use the Zionist movement to achieve their primary aim of creating a *judenrein* German Reich in the years before the Holocaust. In the first of his eight chapters, "The Age of Emancipation," Nicosia traces the convergence of interests that slowly evolved in the nineteenth century between the requirements of Jewish nationalism in Palestine and the imperialist ambitions of the European powers in the Middle East. Ironically, in view of the prevalence of antisemitism in the German Empire, it was to Wilhelmine Germany that early Zionists such as Theodor Herzl

looked for support, believing "that antisemites and their governments, perhaps more than most, would prove to be friends of Zionism" (p. 14) for reasons both of geopolitics and antisemitism.<sup>2</sup> Zionists expected antisemites to support their project because of their shared view of Jews as a distinct people who should avow and embrace their separate nationality. Although Wilhelm II refused to give Zionists the diplomatic support they sought for fear of alienating his Ottoman ally, he favored Jewish emigration to and settlement in Palestine, both to give Germany a foothold in the Middle East and to redirect east European Jewish emigration away from Germany and the West. Even such notorious racial antisemites and proto-Nazis as Paul de Lagarde, Constantin Frantz, Theodor Fritsch, Houston Stuart Chamberlain, Heinrich Class, or Hermann Ahlwardt recognized the utility of Zionism as a means of freeing Germany of Jews. Their fear that a sovereign Jewish state in Palestine might strengthen the imagined "Jewish world conspiracy" was paradoxically mitigated by their simultaneous prejudice that Jews lacked the personal and racial traits required to build and defend a functioning modern state. German Zionists found themselves in a dilemma at the outbreak of the First World War.

The World Zionist executive declared its neutrality in the war, moving its headquarters from Berlin to neutral Copenhagen, and eventually establishing itself in London after the war. Its German branch, however, the Zionistische Vereinigung für Deutschland (ZVfD), like other German-Jewish organizations, declared its full support for the German war effort, framing the war as a struggle against tsarist Russia, where Jews were openly persecuted. ZVfD leaders even questioned the sincerity of the British Balfour Declaration of November 1917 and successfully induced the German government to make a similar gesture in favor of a Jewish national homeland in Palestine in January 1918. Throughout the Weimar era, as Nicosia details in chapter 2, the German government continued to support Zionism as a means of promoting German economic goals in the Mideast. In keeping with its "ethnocentric definition of nationhood" (p. 54), the ZVfD stayed out of German politics and prohibited its officials from seeking high political office in Germany. It also ruled out cooperation with the venerable Centralverein deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens (CV), founded to combat antisemitism in 1893, for fear of reinforcing the CV's assimilationist tendencies. Kurt Blumenfeld, president of the ZVfD from 1924 to 1931, identified the appeal of Marxism, the "ultimate assimilationist mechanism" (p. 60), as the greatest danger to Jews, and propagated Jewish separateness as a prelude to emigration to Palestine as the only workable form of Jewish self-defense against the hostility they faced in Europe. Yet, Zionism had little appeal to German Jews. In 1933 membership in the Centralverein outnumbered ZVfD membership by more than ten to one. Nonetheless the ZVfD faced continuing attacks from the antisemitic radical Right during the Weimar years, not only as a Jewish organization, but also for supporting the British mandate in Palestine.

Determined to reassert a positive Jewish identity and convinced of the futility of assimilation, German Zionist leaders tended to underestimate the threat of the Nazis coming to power and to overestimate the

opportunities that a Nazi government might open up for the Zionist movement. In chapter 3, "Nazi Confusion, Zionist Illusion," Nicosia traces the pragmatic cooperation between Zionists and the Nazi government leading to the Haavara Transfer Agreement of September 1933, which made it possible for German Jews to emigrate to Palestine without leaving all their assets behind, while boosting the German economy by promoting exports to Palestine. Approximately fifty-three thousand German Jews were able to use the Haavara system to migrate to Palestine before the termination of this program in December 1939 as a result of the disruption of all commercial and diplomatic relations with Britain after the start of the war. Yet, between 1933 and 1937 German Jews comprised only 20 percent of Jewish immigrants to Palestine and constituted proportionally even less of the total Jewish population of Palestine. Although even such extreme antisemites as Alfred Rosenberg were quite prepared to exploit the Zionist movement to force Jews out of Germany, their tactical support for Zionism as a means to create an ethnically pure Volksgemeinschaft in no way diminished their distrust of Jews as alleged agents of sedition and subversion, nor did it diminish their certitude that Jews were out to dominate the world. Nicosia is particularly successful in fleshing out the complexities and contradictions in "the dual nature of Nazi policies toward Zionism" in the 1930s (p. 73). On the one hand, the Nazi regime exploited Zionism to promote Jewish emigration to Palestine (though not to create a Jewish state); on the other hand, the regime refused to grant Zionist demands for Jewish civil rights as an officially recognized national minority in Germany during the transition. Aware that German economic restrictions on Jews impeded Jewish emigration, Adolf Hitler sought to shift the blame to Britain for restricting Jewish immigration to Palestine and imposing entry fees on Jewish immigrants. It would be much better, he told his audience in the Berlin Sportpalast in October 1933, "if instead [the British] would say everyone can enter" (p. 78). For their part, German Zionists operated under the illusion that by endorsing Germany's national rebirth under National Socialism, its principles of ethnic or racial descent, and its consciousness of national uniqueness, they could secure German cooperation in establishing a Jewish nation state. In a formal statement addressed to the Nazi regime in June 1933, the ZVfD "questioned the French Revolution's notion of the individual and a nation of individuals that rejected the idea of a people bound together by blood, history, and a spiritual uniqueness" (p. 92). Right-wing Revisionist Zionists, represented in Germany by the newly formed Staatszionistische Organisation, issued a position paper in 1935 recognizing "the right of the German people to form its own national life that will exclude all undesirable mixing of peoples" and calling for the dissolution of "any Jewish organizations in Germany that oppose such [separatist] measures" (p. 95). German Revisionist Zionists also proved useful to the Nazis in opposing an international boycott of German goods, even defying Vladimir Jabotinsky, the founder of the Revisionist movement, on this particular issue.

In separate chapters on "Zionism in Nazi Jewish Policy," "German Zionism: Confrontation with Reality," "Revisionist Zionism in Germany," and "Zionist

Occupational Retraining and Nazi Jewish Policy," Nicosia describes in detail the fitful collaboration even beyond the Kristallnacht pogrom between German Zionists, preparing for Jewish renewal in Palestine, and Nazis, eager to expel Jews in preparation for the coming war for German living space in the east. Revisionist Zionists, who supported the Nazi ban on intermarriage, also proved useful to the Nazis in countering foreign criticism of the Nuremberg Laws. Officials of the Interior Ministry, the Economics Ministry, the Foreign Office, as well as of the SD and Gestapo, were instructed to give preferential treatment to Zionist organizations over other Jewish organizations (which did not, however, exempt individual Zionists from the same ill treatment meted out to other Jews). Only the Zionist movement was permitted to function in Austria after its annexation in March 1938, even though, as Nicosia repeatedly emphasizes, for the Nazis "Zionists were nothing more than convenient tools for facilitating the removal of Jews from Germany" (p. 206). Representatives of the Jewish Agency for Palestine were permitted repeated entry into Germany to work for Jewish emigration even after all Jewish immigration or reentry into Germany was halted in 1938. The regime also supported occupational retraining and Hebrew-language instruction for Jews subject to their commitment to emigrate, despite reservations by ideological hard-liners that agricultural and technological retraining of Jews in Germany would inevitably lead to undesirable social contact between Jews and Aryans. German authorities preferred Palestine as a destination for Jewish emigration for fear of intensifying anti-German feelings in neighboring European countries. The Nazi regime showed no sympathy for Arab nationalism before the start of the war. Indeed, fearing that growing Arab opposition to Jewish immigration would hamper German emigration efforts, the SD issued a report in early 1937, announcing that "any attempt to foster anti-Jewish sentiments among the Arabs in Palestine is strictly prohibited" (p. 135). However, support for Jewish emigration to Palestine did not translate into support for a Jewish state. Indeed, Ernst von Weizsäcker, the leading civil servant in the Foreign Ministry, cautioned against concentrating Jews in Palestine so as not to facilitate the formation of a Jewish state. Instead, he advocated dispersing Jews into small minorities all over the world. Both the Nazis and Revisionist Zionists opposed the Peel Commission's partition plan for Palestine in July 1937 -- the Nazis, because they opposed a Jewish state; the Revisionists, because they opposed an Arab state. Nonetheless, as the British government showed no interest in implementing the Peel Commission's plan, "obstacles to increased Jewish immigration into Palestine were viewed with greater alarm in Berlin than the spectre of a Jewish state" (p. 132). The purpose of Adolf Eichmann's clandestine visit to Palestine in October 1937 was to explore cooperation with anti-British, anti-Arab, and anti-communist officials of the Haganah (the Jewish militia founded in 1920) in efforts to increase both legal and illegal Jewish immigration from Germany. These contacts bore little fruit, however, as the British, intent on restricting Jewish immigration, barred Eichmann from reentering Palestine.

1938 did mark a turning point in Nazi anti-Jewish policies, not only because the Anschluß of Austria (and, a year later, the annexation of

Bohemia and Moravia) added urgency to Nazi efforts to force Jews out of the greater Reich, but also because the violence and destructiveness of the Kristallnacht pogrom had the paradoxical effect of shifting authority to those Nazi agencies that regarded Radauantisemitismus as counterproductive, both for the damage it did to the German economy and for its adverse effects on Germany's image abroad. In the bureaucratic infighting on how best to solve Germany's "Jewish question," the SS favored a more "rational" and "systematic" approach than street violence, but also more punitive measures to force Jews to leave than those enacted by the Interior Ministry. As head of the Four Year Plan, Hermann Göring assigned authority to Reinhard Heydrich to centralize and forcibly expedite the process of Jewish emigration on the model of the Zentralstelle für jüdische Auswanderung, which was headed by Adolf Eichmann in Vienna and eventually in Berlin. All independent Jewish organizations, including both the ZVfD and the Revisionist Zionist organization, were dissolved and brought under Gestapo control as the Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland in 1939. Forced emigration of German Jews remained official German policy right up to the dissolution of the Jewish Agency's Palestine Office in Berlin in May 1941, as described in Nicosia's final chapter, "From Dissolution to Final Solution." The SD worked with agents of the Mossad le'Aliyah Bet (Committee for Illegal Immigration) to step up the illegal movement of Jews from central Europe past British authorities into Palestine in 1938 and 1939 after the imposition of tighter immigration restrictions in the British mandate. The start of the war created further impediments to Jewish emigration, but as late as 1940 "the SS was still focused on emigration as the solution to the Jewish question within the borders of the Greater German Reich" (p. 264). In November 1939, Heydrich wrote to the Foreign Ministry, "the opinion is unanimous that, now as before, the emigration of the Jews must continue even during the war, with all of the means at our disposal" (p. 264). So great was the Nazi emphasis on cleansing Germany of its Jews that the German government prohibited emigration of Polish Jews and refused to grant transit visas to Lithuanian Jews in 1940 lest such migrants reduce the number of entry permits available to Jews from the Altreich. Added to all the other problems that willing German-Jewish émigrés faced was the reluctance of Italy, Yugoslavia, and other neutral countries to issue transit visas for fear that British authorities would return illegal refugees to the countries from which they had set sail.

On the basis of copious research in more than two dozen German, Israeli, British, and North American archives, Nicosia confirms the current historical consensus that the Nazis had no plan for systematic genocide before 1941, although the potential for genocide was always present in Nazi ideology and the party's anti-Jewish policies. Nicosia concludes that before 1941 "the Nazi obsession with removing the Jews from German life was centered primarily on Greater Germany alone . . . with a particularly critical role assigned to Zionism and Palestine" (p. 292). His findings certainly confirm the crucial importance of antisemitism in the origins of the Holocaust, but they also point to war as the key to the radicalization of antisemitic measures to a policy of physical annihilation (as threatened

by Hitler as early as his notorious Reichstag speech of January 1939). Nicosia is critical of "the ever-present tendency to judge the past from the present," noting that from a post-Holocaust perspective, "it is easy today to dismiss early Zionist hopes of some form of accommodation with antisemitism as shockingly naive and illusory" (p. 291). *Zionism and Antisemitism in Nazi Germany* is a scrupulous work of history, not politics, and Nicosia makes no references to the present, except to point out the irony that while anti-Zionism or criticism of the state of Israel in Europe or the United States today is often equated with antisemitism (or viewed as motivated by antisemitism), before 1933 antisemites were more likely to support Zionist aims than to oppose them. Until the Nazi policy of ethnic cleansing left Jews with no alternative to emigration, the most prominent critics of Zionism tended to be Jews who rejected the Zionist claim that Jews had a distinct ethnic or national (as opposed to cultural or religious) identity that made them aliens in the countries in which they lived.

## Notes

1 The classic study remains Peter Pulzer, *The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988).

2 For a suggestive analysis of how Herzl's desire to create a new, manlier Jewish identity was rooted in his own internalization of some of the antisemitic stereotypes so prevalent in his time, see Jacques Kornberg, *Theodor Herzl: From Assimilation to Zionism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993).

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